Viktor Kanász
ELKH-PPKE-PTE, VILMOS FRAKNÓI VATICAN HISTORICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE. INSTITUTE OF HUNGARIAN RESEARCH - HUNGARY

http://hdl.handle.net/2067/49292

NUNCIO GIROLAMO MARTINENGO'S REPORTS ON THE MILITARY EVENTS OF 1552

ABSTRACT
One of the most famous periods of the anti-Ottoman wars was the year 1552. Tish was the time when the Ottoman armies captured among others the castles of Temesvár, Szolnok and Drégely which were originally in the hands of King Ferdinand I Habsburg of Hungary. The famous siege of Eger and the battle of Palást also happened this year. We have a special opportunity for a fresh view of the turbulent events of the war, provided by the examination of the reports written by Girolamo Martinengo. He was the nuncio sent by Pope Julius III to the court of King Ferdinand I. In these reports, the nuncio told in detail about the events of the war in Hungary, not only reporting in a factual and informative manner but also interpreting and commenting. This is gives us a special opportunity to examine how the court of Ferdinand I saw the events, from whom did the nuncio obtain his information and what was the Holy See interested in the aff airs and developments in Hungary? In addition, the reports shows us how the Hungarian theatre of war was integrated into the grand European politics of the time.

KEYWORDS: Diplomacy; Kingdom of Hungary; anti-Ottoman wars; papacy; nuncio.

THE ANTI-OTTOMAN STRUGGLE AND HUNGARY

The year 1552 is one of the most significant and famous periods of the anti-Ottoman struggles of the 16th century in Hungary. The military events of this period determined the conditions of the era for a long time. Although historians internationally examine the Ottoman wars mainly in the context of the actions in the Mediterranean, the importance of the Hungarian theatre of war was well known throughout Europe in its own time, and countless reports and accounts were written about it, especially the sieges of Temesvár and Eger.

Among the diplomatic reports of the time, which were sent to Ferdinand I, King of Bohemia, Hungary, Archduke of Austria – brother of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor – the accounts of Nuncio Girolamo Martinengo stand out. The discussion of these events will not be carried out by following a linear order. After presenting the news of the most notable military affairs, such as the sieges of Veszprém, Temesvár, Eger, and the Battle of Palást, I will highlight two important, not so well observed, although fascinating topics to the Hungarian and European public eye of the time: the question of King Ferdinand's military engagement and the campaign of Prince Maurice of Saxony in Hungary.

***

The fate of the Kingdom of Hungary was of particular importance to King Ferdinand I. After Buda was conquered by Sultan Suleiman in 1541 – and the eastern part of the country was given into the hands of King John Zápolya's widow and son, Isabella Jagiellon, and John Sigismund, as well as the Bishop of Várad, George Martinuzzi (György Fráter/Utyeszenics) – one of Ferdinand's main aims was to regain the lost eastern territories, later known as the Principality of Transylvania. A possibility opened for these purposes in 1551, notably when, under the leadership of George Martinuzzi, the Hungarian Holy Crown was obtained, the queen and John Sigismund were removed from Transylvania, and an army led by Giovanni Battista Castaldo was sent to the province. In the meantime, Ferdinand succeeded in having George Martinuzzi created a cardinal by Pope Julius III. However, distrust of Martinuzzi led to the king's soldiers assassinating the cardinal in December 1551, while the number of incoming news of an impending Ottoman invasion was growing.

Ferdinand endeavoured to be prepared for this, but the spring of 1552 brought one of the most critical periods for the Habsburgs. King Henry II of France invaded the Empire from the west, the German orders led by Maurice, Elector of Saxony revolted, while the Ottoman fleet attacked Italy and the land forces invaded the Kingdom of Hungary. The imperial main forces led by Kara Ahmed Pasha attacked from the south and captured important elements of the Hungarian border fort system, Temesvár and Lippa, while Ali Pasha of Buda occupied Veszprém and the smaller keeps around Buda, destroying the Christian armies sent against him at Palást. The two Ottoman troops united under Szolnok, and after the castle was taken, they moved against Eger. However, the castle, defended by Captain István Dobó, demonstrated heroic resistance and managed to repel the attackers. Meanwhile, Ferdinand invested all his efforts into organizing the defence, sending reinforcements to the Hungarian front and even contemplated his own personal military engagement. Not surprisingly, Nuncio Martinengo, who was at his court, kept Rome constantly informed of military events in Hungary in his reports.

MARTINENGO AND THE OTTOMAN ISSUE

The Ottoman question was a central feature of Martinengo's weekly reports[1]. He was particularly concerned with Transylvanian politics, especially with the following matters: the actions of George Martinuzzi and Isabella, the fate of Castaldo's troops, and the ever-changing (domestic) politics. Nevertheless, due to conflicting pieces of information, Martinengo also struggled to comprehend Transylvanian politics. At times he concluded that the final demise was near, at others he felt that affairs and circumstances in the province were improving, and then in his following week's account he stated the exact opposite viewpoint on more than one occasion. What he clearly perceived, however, was that the forces

1 About Martinengo: Viktor Kanász, "The life and work of the Abbot and Nuncio Girolamo Martinengo in Hungary", *Specimina Nova Pars Prima Sectio Mediaevalis*, 10 (2019) 211-30; Id., *Magyarország és a Szentszék a 16. század közepén. Girolamo Martinengo nuncius és a Magyar Királyság (1550-1554)* (PhD diss., University of Pécs, 2022).

sent to hold the province were constantly struggling with insufficient supplies and kept on asking for reinforcements. According to the nuncio, the army commander, Castaldo, had serious doubts as to whether Transylvania could avoid falling under the Ottoman's control, since he was reluctant to believe that it was manageable to keep the province in royal hands[2].

The difficulties are truly illustrated by the failures of 1552. One of the first significant events of the year was the "Peril of Szeged". On the night of 20–21 February, a Christian army surprised the Ottoman-held settlement, the palisade of which was successfully occupied, but the castle remained to be obtained by the Turks[3]. The highly publicised news had already been the subject of discussions in Vienna by 28 February[4]. Nevertheless, it was not until 7 March that Martinengo, who was in Bratislava, reported the unexpected military successes to Rome. According to his accounts, the castle was besieged by the Hungarians and Germans under Bernardo de Aldana, but the Pasha of Buda was on his way to rescue the keep[5]. These remarks were indeed credible, as the castle was failed to be seized, and Hadim Ali, Pasha of Buda, defeated the Christian troops on 1 March[6]. Shortly after the news arrived in Vienna, on 10 March, the nuncio reported that Szeged had been recaptured by the Ottomans[7].

The newsworthiness of the affair on a European scale is demonstrated by the fact that the incidents were known throughout Italy. In addition to Martinengo, the Venetian

---

2 Helmut Goetz, ed., *Nuntiatur des Girolamo Martinengo (1550-1554)* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1965), letter 116. Castaldo has already wished to resign several times, further see ÖStA HHStA UA AA Kt. 67. Konv B. 1552. fol. 58r. The international context of the war more recently: Fodor Pál, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire. The Ottomans in Central Europe. A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390-1566)* (Budapest: RCH HAS, 2015), 103-129; Zoltán Korpás and János B. Szabó, "If they came as a legation, they are many, if they are soldiers, they are few". The military background of the 1551 attempt to unite Hungary", in *Isabella Jagiellon, Queen of Hungary (1539-1559)*, eds. Ágnes Máté and Teréz Oborni (Budapest: MTA BTK, 2020), 147-62.

3 Péter Kulcsár, ed., *Humanista történetírók* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1977), 596-600; Sándor László Tóth, "Két világ között: Tót Mihály és a "szegedi veszedelem" 1552-ben", in *Oszmán-magyar viszony a 16-18. században,* ed. Zsuzsanna J. Újváry (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2020), 96-7.

4 Imre Szántó, *A végvári rendszer kiépítése és fénykora Magyarországon. 1541–1593* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985), 85; D. Csaba Veress, *A szegedi vár* (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1986), 57-8.

5 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 53.

6 Szántó, *A végvári*, 88-93; Miklós Istvánffy, *Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában*, I/2, ed. Péter Benits (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2003), 174-79; Tóth, "Két világ között", 105-09; Zoltán Péter, Bagi "Mohácstól Zsitvatorokig (1526-1606)", in *Magyarország hadtörténete II*. ed. Kálmán Mészáros (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2020), 32-3.

7 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 55. Castaldo only notified the emperor about the defeat on 4 March. Veress, *A szegedi vár*, 65.

Nuncio[8], and even Pope Julius III has expressed their opinions on the matter. According to Del Monte's letter to Martinengo, the Pope declared that he did not consider the occupation of Szeged to be a favourable move, since it would upset the Ottomans a great deal resulting in a possible attack, which the Holy Father did not want, due to the fact that hardly any help could be expected from others. The emperor was very preoccupied and the Pope himself required help as well[9]. On the same day, King Ferdinand's envoy to Rome, Don Diego Lasso, also articulated Rome's joy and concerns about the seizure of Szeged, as they were anxious that this might aggravate the Turks[10]. The consequent acts ultimately vindicated the Pope's stance.

Meanwhile, increasingly worrying news arrived from Istanbul. By the end of April, it has already been discussed at the Viennese court that the Sultan had threatened with war if John Sigismund was not permitted to return to Transylvania. A month later, rumours started to circulate about Suleiman's personal arrival[11].

The Ottoman troops eventually launched an offensive. One of the first major theatres of these was Veszprém. On 30 May, Martinengo reported that the Turks were at Veszprém, "a bishop's town in Hungary", which is near Styria, insufficiently supplied with Hungarian troops, and in a poor condition, certainly being taken without the hope of liberation[12]. On 5 June, the nuncio had already heard about the capture of the castle on 1 June and the massacre of its guards, which caused great discontent among the Hungarians[13]. On 2 July, Cardinal Del Monte, the Secretary of State, replied to the Nuncio. In his letter he informed him that the loss of Veszprém devastated the Pope and the College of Cardinals[14]. Ferdinand I also informed the Holy See in a letter about the loss of Veszprém and the Ottoman attacks on Transylvania, seeking for aids from Rome. The Pope set up a commission of seven

---

8 Franco Gaeta, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia. (2 gennaio 1552–14 luglio 1554)*, vol. 6 (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'età Moderna e Contemporanea, 1967), 76.

9 Goetz, *Martinengo***,** letter 57. The European newsworthiness of the events: Thuani, Jac[ques] Aug[uste], *Historiarum sui temporis opera*, 1 (s.l. 1609), 190-92.

10 August von Druffel, ed., *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts. mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Bayerns Fürstenhaus. Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, II: *1552*. (München: M. Reiger'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1880), 266, 295.

11 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 68, 73; Druffel, *Briefe*, 449. Compare: this was a familiar theme in Rome and Venice as well, e.g., Druffel, *Briefe*, 152, 174-75; Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 91.

12 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 74. The castle was surrounded on 20 May, and news of the siege spread through the court on 28 May. Organising the liberation of the keep began during the siege, although it was not successful. E.g., MNL OL E 21-1552.06.01.

13 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 75; Istvánffy, *História*, 182-84; Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 608-09.

14 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 78. Compare: HHStA ÖStA Rom, *Correspondenz*, 13. 1550-1555. 207v, 211v

cardinals to deal with the matter[15]. In addition, the Venetian nuncio also reminisced about the siege of Veszprém in his account of 18 June, however, he shared with Del Monte the less authentic but all the more fascinating news he had heard from a Czech nobleman[16].

After the occupation of Veszprém, the Pasha of Buda turned against the Hungarian holds surrounding his seat. Martinengo also disclosed these incidents in detail. He discussed the siege of Drégely, defended by György Szondi. He noted that it was a small but well-fortified and guarded stronghold of the Esztergom archbishopric[17]. Similarly, the invasion of Buják and the castle of Ság, once a Premonstratensian monastery, are also included in his records. The nuncio pointed out here that the loss of these two small keeps was also dangerous, due to their close proximity to the mines of Upper Hungary[18].

He also commemorated the Battle of Palást, which resulted in a great defeat from the Christians' perspective. On 12 August, he noted that the Pasha of Buda had gathered men to fight a battle with the Christians, thus, on 9 August he attacked Erasmus von Teufel with 15 000 men. After the battle, only a few Germans and Italians survived, and although the Bishop of Vác was killed, many Hungarians managed to escape. According to the nuncio, there was no one to guard the frontier after the combat, and regardless of the fact that the Ottomans had suffered significant losses, they were still capable to cause further damages[19]. The gravity of the battle and the contemporary value of the news are demonstrated by the fact that the Venetian nuncio and the nuncio of Charles V both reported the events[20].

The southern affairs did not escape his attention either; he was also aware that the Turkish commanders who had sacked Slavonia had retreated after the capture of Csázma[21]. The nuncio also disclosed the siege of Szolnok. In his note on 8 September

---

15 Goetz, *Martinengo,* letter 78; Tusor Péter and Nemes Gábor, eds., *Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae (1426–1605)* (Budapest-Roma: Gondolat Kiadó, 2011), 105; Tusor Péter, "A konstanzi bulla "alkalmazása". A magyar királyi főkegyúri jog a 15-16. században", in "*Causa unionis, causa fidei, causa reformationis in capite et membris"*, eds. Attila Bárány and László Pósán (Debrecen: Printart-Press, 2014), 236.

16 Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 123.

17 Goetz, *Martinengo,* letter 80. Compare, Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 609-11. King Ferdinand informed Charles V of the seizure of the castle on the 15th. Korpás Zoltán, "I. Ferdinánd levelezése V. Károly melletti követével, Juan Alonso de Gámizzal. (1542-1556)", *Fons,* 16 (2009): 343.

18 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 83, 81. According to Castaldo, the castle (*Arcem Buyack*) was repaired by the Turks shortly after the siege. ÖStA HHStA UA AA Kt. 68. Konv A. 1552. 153v.

19 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 87. On the same day, Ferdinand I reported the battle to his envoy being at the side of Charles V. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 344.

20 Heinrich Lutz, ed., *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Camaiani und Achille de Grassi. Legation des Girolamo Dandino (1552-1553)* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1959), 96-97. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 145, 165.

21 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90. Compare, Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 344; Szabolcs

1552, he declared that the castle was besieged, which was well equipped with artillery and troops, but would require two thousand men to defend it, however, only a thousand were available there[22].

WHAT WAS LOST AND WHAT IS LEFT – THE SIEGE OF TEMESVÁR AND EGER

The nuncio also provided a comprehensive account of the actions of the Ottoman army. The first significant point of it was the strategically important city of Temesvár, defended by István Losonczi. On 5 June, the nuncio wrote that rumour had it that Ahmed Pasha would construct a bridge on the Tisza to besiege Temesvár, Szolnok and Eger, as the Ottoman armies considered it unreasonable to march towards Austria[23]. Twenty days later, it became a certainty for him that the Turks were moving against Temesvár[24]. The siege of the keep was then disclosed several times. On 13 July, the nuncio still expressed his hopes for victory[25], but by 18 July he saw a much less significant chance of it[26]. On 26 July and 2 August, he explained meticulously how gallantly Temesvár had been held so far by its exhausted defenders[27]. The next day, however, breaking the chain of reports he had been writing every week or so, he informed the Holy See of the occupation of Temesvár, although he had almost know information about the details, including the circumstances of the captain's beheading[28]. It was only a few days later when he could provide shed some new light on the latter event[29]. However, Martinengo was not the only one interested in these affairs; the fate of Temesvár was being followed all over Europe, for example, the news of the two sieges of the fortress reached not just Charles V, but the nuncio as well[30].

Varga, *Europe's Leonidas: Miklós Zrínyi, Defender of Szigetvár (1508-1566)* (Budapest: RCH HAS, 2016), 181.

22 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90. Compare, Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 158; Thuani, *Historiarum*, 195; Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 345-46; Druffel, *Briefe*, 770; Herrmann, Johannes Wartenberg, Günther Winter and Christian, eds., *Politische Korrespondenz des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen*, vol. 6. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006), 516.

23 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 75.

24 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 76. Two days later, on 27 July, Ferdinand I sent a note to his envoy from Passau, who was at his brother's side, that Temesvár was being successfully defended, although they needed a thousand more men, and Castaldo complained that he did not have enough capacity. He subsequently informed the emperor of the fate of Temesvár. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 342-44. Compare, Thuani, *Historiarum*, 213-17; Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 606.

25 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 81.

26 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 82.

27 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 83, 84.

28 «[…] after I was informed about the fall of Temesvár, although I don't know precisely what happened, I will write the news». Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 85.

29 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 86.

30 Druffel, *Briefe*, 705, 733. Georg Kupke, ed., *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Bertano*

***

The siege of Eger in 1552 is one of the most famous military affairs of early modern Hungary. Interestingly, the first mention of the city in Martinengo's accounts dates from a year earlier, in 1551[31]. It became the centre of attention in the following year, after the fall of Drégely. The nuncio's excellent geographical knowledge is supported by the fact that he considered the fall of Drégely and Buják a vital issue, as their garrisons protected the road to Transylvania and Eger[32]. By that time already, he highlighted that Eger was a famous city of great significance due to its location, but unfortunately, the Turks were marching against it. He also listed the characteristics of the town's fortifications: he was aware that the castle was not very secure, since it was well fortified and manned, but there was a hill from which the keep could be held under fire, making it weak and less resilient[33]. On 16 September, he documented the beginning of the siege – starting on 11 September – and on 25 September he wrote that according to some reports «the enemy had abandoned the siege of Eger». This is one example of the many hoaxes circulating in the Viennese court[34]. A week later, on 2 October, he received information on two major assaults which were repulsed by the Eger defenders, who, he says, were well prepared for the attack. As an example, he recounts that they burned everything within a radius of 8–10 km around the castle, leaving the besieging army without any food[35].

On 9 October, the news of Captain Dobó's famous oath can also be found at Martinengo, according to which the defenders of Eger would rather die than surrender the castle. Besides these recollections, he also emphasized that the Turks were exhausted[36]. By 16 October, he could provide Rome some good news indeed: the Turks were disappointed by the failed invasions and were being decimated by a plague reportedly killing hundreds of people a day. They are unable to stabilize the public sentiment among the besiegers neither with attempts to convince, nor with threats. The Ottoman soldiers expressed their desire to go home, but Ali, the

---

und Pietro Camaiani 1550-1552 (Berlin, 1901), 101-02. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 141-43, 148. Fake news about the siege, see Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 731., Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 490.

31 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 33. Compare, Gustav Turba, ed., *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe (Dispacci di Germania)*, voll. I-II (Wien: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1892), 448.

32 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 81. Szántó, *A végvári*, 145. Ferdinand also interpreted the advancements as the Ottoman commanders aiming to cut off the road to Transylvania. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 343.

33 This can be identified with the Almagyar hill or Királyszéke. Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 83.

34 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 91-2. Numerous similar rumours were circulating in the later imperial city. Therefore, Ferdinand I believed to know that the Pasha of Buda had died during the siege of Eger. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 347-53; Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 149, 165.

35 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 93.

36 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 94.

Pasha of Buda, is forcing the siege. The Christian armies fortified Győr (which he called the gateway to Austria)[37], fearing that it would be the next stronghold to be attacked after Eger[38].
On 28 October, he had already been informed about the victory from ten days prior. In his account he noted, the walls of Eger Castle had been destroyed, some of the noblemen inside were killed and many wounded, but the siege had failed. The Ottomans tried in vain, but the defenders refused to accept any terms of surrender[39]. Even on 5 November, he devoted his attention to the matter, mentioning that the Ottoman forces had retreated from Eger, leaving a lot of ammunition, food, and dead corpses behind – even though they previously considered the city to be the weakest among the other lost ones. According to Martinengo, «but the goodness of God, the virtue of the soldiers – half of whom were missing – and the diligence of the bishop, who took care [of the city] and kept more men there than usual, protected [Eger] for us»[40].
It was not only through Martinengo that Rome received information about the siege of the episcopal see, but also, among others, from the Venetian nuncio Ludovico Beccadelli, who repeatedly informed Cardinal Del Monte of the actions[41]. Thoroughly observing these sources it is apparent, that Nuncio Martinengo, with

37 Martinengo correctly assessed the key role of Győr in the defence of Austria and Vienna. Further see Géza Pálffy: *A császárváros védelmében. A győri főkapitányság története 1526-1598* (Győr: Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Győri Levéltár, 1999).

38 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 96. Ferdinand I wrote to the court of Charles V a day later, mentioning among other things that the defenders of Eger were holding out and causing much damage to the besiegers. He also mentioned that he was confident that the Turks would abandon the siege when the bad weather arrived. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 346. On the demoralised state of the Ottoman army, the plight of Ali Pasha and the plague among the besiegers, see: MNL OL P 1314. No. 12962. and No. 17286., Szántó, *A végvári*, 231, 234; Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 536. It is possible that Ottoman soldiers who contracted the plague in here also brought the disease back to Constantinople. Tamás Kruppa, "Pestisjárvány és háború a 16. századi Magyarországon", in *Dögvészkalauz. Járványok és gyógyításuk története az ókortól napjainkig*, eds. Dóra Czeferner and Tamás Fedeles (Pécs: Kronosz Könyvkiadó, 2021), 102-103.

39 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 97. On the very same day, Ferdinand I wrote to the court of Charles V with news of the end of the siege. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 353. Compare, Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 536.

40 Goetz, *Martinengo,* 98. Miklós Oláh, the bishop of Eger truly spared no effort to help the defence of the castle, for example, he even monetised his gold pots to send material aid. Pongrác Sörös, "Egy fejezet Oláh Miklós életéből", *Katolikus Szemle*, 19/2 (1905): 130.

41 Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 158, 165, 170, 174, 177. Maurice of Saxony announced on the 28th that the Turks had retreated. The siege was also commemorated in the contemporary newspapers of the time. Druffel, *Briefe*, 796, 825; Herrmann–Wartenberg–Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 490, 516-17, 535. On the reception of the news in Rome: HHStA ÖStA Rom, Correspondenz, 13. 1550-1555. 249v.

his geographic and military knowledge, correctly assessed the importance of Eger. His reports also reflect when news arrived in Vienna and how military affairs were perceived in Ferdinand's immediate environment. Comparing the content of these reports with our current historical knowledge it can be concluded that the nuncio's information was mostly accurate, but in some cases, false reports were obtained. Martinengo, however, was not only informed in Viennese circles: we know, for example, that Castaldo also corresponded with him, initiating the exchange between the parties as early as 20 August 1552 regarding the need to fortify Eger. On 25 November 1552 he cited the battle of Eger as an admirable and exemplary case to the nuncio.[42]

Overall, Martinengo wrote several times, in varying degrees of detail, usually based on authentic information, about the Ottoman advance towards Eger and the siege itself. Therefore, in reality, Rome and the papacy devoted significant attention to the events and the development of the theatre of war in Hungary, thus, the siege of Eger was not a matter of indifference for papal diplomacy as well.

THE BROKEN PROMISE – THE KING AT THE HEAD OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMIES

The almost constant attacks by the Ottoman troops led to the emergence of the idea that King Ferdinand himself would go to war[43]. The monarch seems to have put his faith in the concept. On 29 February 1552, at the Hungarian Diet, he declared that he would be personally present with the army, and that the noble orders should not delay, «for the enemy does not sleep, and now one hour worth a year»[44]. It was also declared in the acts that in case of the Sultan attacked Hungary, the emperor, accompanied by his two sons, would confront the enemy with his entire military force[45].

Martinengo's report addressed the issue, specifically discussing the necessary actions if the king or one of his sons went to war against the Ottomans[46]. As much as King Ferdinand desired to lead the campaign personally, the geopolitical situation intervened. The monarch, on the command of his brother, Charles V, was requested to go to Linz and then Passau to negotiate with the rebelling imperial orders. This forced the king to stay away from the borders during the most critical months, thus he was unable to send the necessary troops to the Hungarian theatre of operations[47].

---

42 Goetz, *Martinengo,* 325, 331-32.

43 E.g., Vilmos Fraknói, ed., *Magyar Országgyűlési emlékek. Magyar Királyság (1526-1606), Erdély (1540-1699)*, vol. 3*: 1546-1556* (Budapest: MTA, 1876), 15.

44 Sándor Garády, "Türk Dániel naplója, 1548-1559", *Századok*, 5 (1871): 16.

45 Fraknói, *Országgyűlési*, 332, 336, 357-78. The Vatican Apostolic Archives also possesses old copies of the articles of the Diet. AAV, Misc. Arm. II, vol. 55, fol. 74-87r, on the king's marching to war: AAV, Misc. Arm. II, vol. 55, fol. 75r. On the same day, 29 March, King Ferdinand also wrote from Bratislava to Charles V, promising him a personal engagement on the behalf of him and Maximilian. Druffel, *Briefe*, 299.

46 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 60.

47 He also reported these events to Charles V in 1553, demonstrating that he was

On 13 July, the nuncio discussed that, despite the difficulties encountered, Ferdinand had promised to arm himself or his son, Maximilian, by 10 August, but as it was unlikely that the king would be able to send troops to Hungary, he wished to mobilise the army of Maurice of Saxony to fulfil this purpose. According to Martinengo, the monarch explained his absence to the Hungarians demanding his return by stating that he must remain in Passau, where he was suffering and labouring for the survival of the land and the country[48]. The situation had not improved significantly by the beginning of August. On 7 August, Martinengo noted that Ferdinand was unable to come to Hungary, causing distress among its people, and that Archduke Maximilian believed that change cannot be expected in these circumstances[49].
Nevertheless, the news of a possible military engagement reached the Ottoman leaders, and when the Pasha of Buda discovered that Ferdinand was about to get involved in the military procedures, he declared his welcoming sentiments and expressed his hopes that this time, he, the Pasha, would have the chance to show the world that the real master of the country was not Ferdinand indeed, but his master, the sultan. Based on the records of the nuncio, at that time the king was still adamant about joining the forces, but there was no sign of actual participation taking place[50]. Perhaps this is the reason why the French envoy to Venice was reluctant to believe that the king truly intended about going to war[51].
This was still the case at the beginning of September: according to Martinengo, the king's march was further delayed, and the Hungarians were convinced that without his aid, the country would be lost. Ferdinand claimed that he personally wished to go and was not fleeing from battle[52]. The delay generated reproaches to which Ferdinand replied that he was doing all he could, but at the end, he personally had never been involved in leading a military operation in Hungary[53]. Nevertheless, the idea arose whether Archduke Maximilian should attend to the forces, consequently he arrived in Hungary, in the Csallóköz[54]. However, a possible

putting his brother's affairs before his own interests. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 355-63. Compare, Thuani, *Historiarum*, 213, Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 645-46.

48 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 81. On numerous occasions, the absence of the king was used by the nobles to justify their avoidance to go to war.

49 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 86. Although the king was in Passau, he also attended to Hungarian affairs from there, e.g., MNL OL P 419. A–41–No. 8.

50 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 89.

51 Druffel, *Briefe*, 750.

52 Therefore, according to the Nuncio, the only and most appropriate remedy to the problems that have arisen is for King John's son to return to Transylvania. Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90.

53 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 91. According to Ferenc Forgách, a famous contemporary historian, «Ferdinand did not go to war personally – as was his habit to state – but continued to delay, as before. By chance or by grace, by the court men of wealth, and by his recurring financial problems simultaneously prevented him to act so». Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 611-12.

54 Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 159; Szántó, *A végvári*, 179.

campaign was prevented by the Archduke's serious illness, which became so severe that his life was feared[55].

The Hungarian nobility did not forget what had happened, and at the beginning of the following year King Ferdinand declared that he would have gone to war against the Turks personally if the siege of Eger had not already ended and if winter had not been in such close proximity[56]. At the Diet of Sopron in 1553, Ferdinand explained to the orders how he interpreted the events of the previous year. He emphasized that a serious decision was made, namely, to launch a personal campaign against the Ottomans the previous year, and that everything was prepared for this endeavour, but upon his return to Vienna after the Diet, he was confronted with the unexpected news that a domestic unrest had broken out again in German territories. Therefore, not only out of respect for the emperor – but also because he expected substantial financial assistance against the Turks from the imperial court – he devoted all his might in trying to restore peace between Charles V and the rebellious princes, which efforts have proven to be fruitful. In addition, he did not fail to fortify the Hungarian outposts and to maintain an army in Hungary, Transylvania, and Slavonia. In the end, the campaign was cancelled, but the king was determined to keep his promise, which is why he summoned the orders. However, during the previous year, several castles fell, and the royal army suffered a severe strike due to the fact, that the orders were reluctant to take up arms despite being repeatedly called upon to do so. Therefore, Ferdinand «blamed the grievous events of the past year on the negligence and carelessness of the Hungarians», which stirred a great uproar[57]. Regardless, the orders asked the king again – without any success – for him or his son to lead the armies in Hungary[58].

There was although one prince who eventually took an active part in the Hungarian military actions in 1552 with his army of thousands. He was none other than Maurice, Electoral Prince of Saxony, who had been fighting against Emperor Charles just a few months earlier.

FROM ENEMY TO ALLY – MAURICE OF SAXONY

We could whiteness how greatly Ferdinand needed an army to counter Ottoman attacks. In these desperate times, Prince Maurice was given a key role. On 12 March 1552, Martinengo reported that he had received information from Archduke Maximilian of Maurice's offer, namely that he would come to Hungary with three thousand cavalry men to fight the Turks, completely at his own expense[59]. In order to fulfil the undertaking, Maurice had requested the release of his father-in-law,

---

55 Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 347-52, 355-63.

56 Fraknói, *Országgyűlési*, 405.

57 Fraknói, *Országgyűlési*, 415, 417-18; Garády, *Türk*, 22.

58 Goetz, *Martinengo,* letter 118, Fraknói, *Országgyűlési*, 420. On 17 April 1553, Canisius wrote in a letter that «it is uncertain whether our king is preparing to reconquer Hungary» Gábor Jablonkay SJ, "Jézus Társaságának első érintkezései Magyarországgal", *Katolikus Szemle*, 23/8 (1909): 828.

59 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 56., Druffel, *Briefe*, 222, 268, 457.

Philip of Hesse[60].
King Ferdinand and Prince Maurice first met in Linz on 19 April[61]. Although the negotiations were held in secret, the Nuncio remained in Linz and tried to obtain as much information as he could. In the meantime, he also had to face the fact that the news of the truce between his commissioner, the Pope, and the King of France – being concluded on 29 April – did not particularly delight Ferdinand[62]. Perhaps this factor contributed to the exclusion of Martinengo by the king from the negotiations in Passau. In his account of 3 May, the nuncio documented the incident, stating that on that same day, the monarch had informed him through a secret adviser that he could not stay long in Innsbruck. In response, Martinengo requested an audience, but the king handed over the commission of the investigation into Martinuzzi's murder and ordered him back to Vienna to take care of matter. The Nuncio, inevitably did not wished to be away from the Emperor and only whiteness the latest advancements from distance, therefore he insisted on staying to which the king reply was that «it is not good for you to come among people who look askance at you, who hate you»[63]. It is dubious by all means whether the king was only thinking of the Protestant negotiating party in this case, or whether the reconciliation between Pope Julius III and Henry II also played a role.

Nevertheless, Rome continued to rely on the news received from the Nuncio on the negotiations[64]. Thus, among other issues, he expressed his hopes to the king that Maurice would assist on the Hungarian field of battle[65]. Ultimately, on 7 August, he broadcasted the binding of peace and the news of Maurice's confidence in his army of 13,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry[66]. The king was in dire need of this army in the Kingdom of Hungary, and therefore in his letter of 12 August, he asked Charles V to order Maurice to join as soon as possible[67]. Maurice also urged the departure of the army, since his men began to disassemble when they learned that they had to come to Hungary[68].

---

60 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 58.

61 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 64. Compare, Kupke, *Nuntiaturen*, 368-70.

62 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 69, 71, 72.

63 Goetz, *Martinengo,* letter 71. letter. About the audience: ÖStA HHStA UA AA 72. Konv.B. fol. 111r.

64 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 72. At this time, and in the period that followed, the imperial diets became an increasingly difficult terrain. With the word of Alexander Koller, a "minefield" for the representatives of the Holy See. Alexander Koller, "La dieta di Augusta del 1582 come spazio di esperienza diplomatica. L'esempio dei rappresentanti della curia romana", in *Diplomatische Wissenkulturen der Frühen Neuzeit. Erfahrungsräume und Orte der Wissensproduktion*. ed. Guido Braun (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 116.

65 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 80.

66 Goetz, *Martinengo,* letter 86; Lutz, *Nuntiaturen*, 77-8, 81; Turba, *Depeschen*, 542; Kulcsár, *Humanista,* 646; Thuani, *Historiarum*, 196-97, 217-18.

67 Szántó, *A végvári*, 106; Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 344.

68 Druffel, *Briefe*, 732.

The prince did indeed leave for Hungary, but his joy was not without its ups and downs. In addition to the mistrust that remained between the parties, on 21 August the nuncio wrote from Vienna that the soldiers of Maurice did not want to fight on the Hungarian front[69]. In addition, a problem, which would cause issues later started to emerge, namely the small number of infantry and cavalry[70]. Furthermore, on 8 September Martinengo disclosed that the prince had arrived with three thousand five hundred infantry and one thousand five hundred horsemen, who are selected soldiers, but insolent to those known to be religious[71]. Besides the above-mentioned matters, on 16 September the Nuncio had already expressed his worries that there was little confidence that Maurice would keep his oath of allegiance[72].
The Saxon prince strengthened and fortified Győr (Raab), a key city for the defence of Vienna, in order to ward off a possible Ottoman attack[73]. Furthermore, based on Martinengo's narrative, he was not only preparing a passive defence, but also planned to attack the archbishop's seat, Esztergom, in order to relieve Eger[74]. In the end, the great attack on Esztergom was cancelled, but Maurice nevertheless sent a troop of mainly Hussars towards Esztergom, who earned a brilliant victory, drowning part of the enemy in the Danube and capturing more than a hundred Turks[75]. The departure of the liberating army was also aborted. This may have been due to the fact that the assembled forces were considered too small for a notable

69 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 88; Druffel, *Briefe*, 714; Turba, *Depeschen*, 545.

70 Lutz, *Nuntiaturen*, 97, 95; Turba, *Depeschen*, 546-48.

71 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90. In a letter written to Castaldo on 14 August, King Ferdinand estimated that Maurice's army had 10-12,000 infantry and 3-4,000 cavalry. Szántó, *A végvári*, 235. Others estimated this sum to be somewhere between 11-16,000. E.g., István Sugár, *Az egri vár és viadala*. (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1971), 102; Bagi, *Mohácstól*, 36. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 345-46, 355-63. On 13 August, the Venetian nuncio had knowledge of 4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantries. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 142-43, 148, 157. By 1 October, he knew about 10 000 infantry and 3 000 cavalry: Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 159. Compare. Herrmann, Wartenberg andWinter, *Korrespondenz*, 516-517.

72 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 96.

73 Goetz, *Martinengo,* letter 91. Compare, Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 353. At this time, the opinion that the Turks would march on Győr and then attack Vienna from there was well known. Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 471, 490-91.

74 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 97. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 165, 170. The background to the news may have been that the king had repeatedly urged Maurice, and Castaldo had also strongly urged the prince to launch a liberating campaign on Eger, or if not, at least to move on to Esztergom. Sugár, *Az egri*, 103, Szántó, *A végvári*, 235-37. E.g., ÖStA HHStA UA AA Kt. 67. Konv B. 1552, fol. 15r-18r, 49r-50v, 102r. On 18 October, however, Maurice complained that he had not received permission from Ferdinand to attack, consequently there was nothing else to do but defend the border, and that he would have a chance to attack in the spring, when his health improved. Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 516-17.

75 Druffel, *Briefe*, 796, Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 536.

campaign[76]. Thus, although the keep of Győr was still fortified, there was no significant altercation between his army and the Ottoman troops[77].
During the span of autumn, the prince received increasingly worrying news from his estates, also an epidemic broke out in his army, which urged the prince to leave, and after defending Eger, he set off for home between 28 October and 1 November[78]. In his notes of 29 December, the nuncio also noted that, as far as he knew, the prince had stayed in Wrocław, since he had caught the French disease, syphilis – which was raging at the time – and tried to heal from it[79].
The failure of the offensive campaign led to a very negative assessment of Maurice's activities in Hungary by his Hungarian contemporaries and later historiography. However, it was not without results, on the contrary. It expressed a strong message, which Ferdinand – and the Ottoman leadership – clearly perceived. The king believed that the military march of his former enemy on his side demonstrated to the Ottomans they are not to trust the French, who believed that the imperial orders were against the emperor, also urging them to be more cautious[80].

CONCLUSION

Closely investigating the most substantial affairs of Martinengo's nunciature, the war –rooted in the Habsburg–Valois antagonism, and the alliance of the Protestant imperial orders, which set much of the Empire on fire as well as to northern Italy – has a prominent part. As these advancements had a major influence on the decisions of Pope Julius III and Ferdinand I, Martinengo alertly followed the news he received and obtained, for e.g., about the siege of Parma, the campaign of Maurice of Saxony, and the negotiations in Linz and Passau. In fact, we can assume that one of the focal points of his reports was this great power rivalry, which not only seized the nuncio's attention but also occupied Ferdinand I's military capacities. This is important to emphasize, since this fundamental geostrategic fact tends to be forgotten in Hungarian literature in the context of the castle wars of the 1550s, and Ferdinand I's personal military engagement and the lack of imperial assistance.
Regardless of much attention Martinengo devoted to the matters of the West, the other subject of his interest was clearly the course of the Ottoman wars. The political and, above all, military events in Hungary between 1551–1552 constitutes a vital part of his reports. From the very beginning of his Nunciature, he tracked the fate of

76 Compare, Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 347-32.

77 Goetz, *Martinengo,* 98.

78 Druffel, *Briefe*, 793-94, 796, 805; Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 1158; Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 97. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 353.

79 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 104. Archduke Maximilian was also aware of Maurice's illness. Druffel, *Briefe*, 809, Johannes Herrmann, "Zu Krankheiten und Tod des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen", *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte*, 81 (2010): 69-71. Up until today, it is still unclear exactly what disease the Prince was suffering from, perhaps he was infected with the plague.

80 Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 263; Barnabás Guitman, Zoltán Korpás, Ferenc Tóth, et al., "A magyarországi török várháborúk nemzetközi háttere, 1547-1556", *Világtörténet*, 9/2 (2019): 286.

the eastern part of the country closely. He also disclosed the unification procedures and regularly issued reports on Castaldo's army in Transylvania. Similarly to his contemporaries, Martinengo, despite his best efforts, had difficulties to comprehend the affairs of Transylvania. The main reason behind was Castaldo's contradictory and often exaggerated reports.

Sensibly, the anti-Ottoman struggles appear most often and most prominently in his reports in 1552, in one of the most momentous years of the castle wars. This is the period when he provided a detailed account of the progress of the Ottoman armies, week by week, including the unsuccessful attempt to recapture Szeged, the fall of Veszprém, the Ottoman seizure of Lippa, Szolnok, Drégely, Buják and Ság, and the Battle of Palást. He described most meticulously the fall of Temesvár, the famous siege of Eger and the heroic stand of the castle defenders.

He separately dedicated efforts to discuss the questions often raised by the Hungarian orders: when and why did Ferdinand I not personally join the war efforts against the Ottomans? In the context of this issue, a lot of evidence can be found on how Ferdinand agreed with Maurice of Saxony to march his army into Hungary, which, if it could not be a substitute for the original plans, signalled an important message to the Ottoman commanders.

At the same time, Martinengo wrote surprisingly little about the affairs of the Hungarian Church compared to the events of the war and was less receptive to the pressing problems of the disintegrating medieval church structures. This clearly demonstrates that during the reign of Ferdinand, both the papacy and the royal court were concerned with the fate of Hungary, and that the events in the kingdom were interpreted at a pan-European level. Consequently, it is a definitive refutation of the historical topos that the papacy and the Habsburg court considered the Kingdom of Hungary merely as a buffer zone. It should be pointed out, however, that outside of the episcopal sees and the cardinalate, ecclesiastical and religious matters were not in the centre of attention, and the nuncios, including Martinengo, taken Hungary primarily as a theatre of war, embedded in the framework of the pan-European anti-Ottoman struggle. This is the main reason why the nuncio paid that much attention to the war in Hungary.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano
Misc. Arm.: Miscellanea Armadi
ELTE EKK: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Könyvtára
MNL: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár
OL: Országos Levéltár
ÖStA: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv
HHStA: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
UA: Ungarische Akten
AA: Allgemeine Akten

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bagi, Zoltán Péter. "Mohácstól Zsitvatorokig (1526-1606)". In *Magyarország hadtörténete II. Az oszmán hódítás kora. 1526-1718*, edited by Kálmán Mészáros, 13-106. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2020.

Druffel, von August, ed. *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts. mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Bayerns Fürstenhaus. Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, II: *1552*. München: M. Reiger'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1880.

Fodor, Pál. *The Unbearable Weight of Empire. The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390-1566).* Budapest: RCH HAS, 2015.

Gaeta, Franco, ed. *Nunziature di Venezia*, 6: *(2 gennaio 1552-14 luglio 1554).* Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'età Moderna e Contemporanea, 1967.

Garády, Sándor. "Türk Dániel naplója, 1548-1559". *Századok*, 5 (1871): 12-30.

Goetz, Helmut, ed. *Nuntiatur des Girolamo Martinengo (1550-1554)* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag), 1965.

Guitman Barnabás, Korpás Zoltán, Tóth Ferenc, and Szabó János. "A magyarországi török várháborúk nemzetközi háttere, 1547–1556". *Világtörténet*, 9 (2019): 253-93.

Herrmann, Johannes. "Zu Krankheiten und Tod des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen". *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte*, 81 (2010): 59-82.

Herrmann Johannes, Wartenberg Günther and Winter Christian, eds. *Politische Korrespondenz des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen,* vol. 6: *2 Mai 1552-11. Juli 1553 mit ergänzenden Dokumenten zum Tod des Kurfürsten.* Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006.

Istvánffy, Miklós. *Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában,* I/2, edited by Péter Benits. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2003.

Jablonkay, Gábor SJ. "Jézus Társaságának első érintkezései Magyarországgal". *Katolikus Szemle*, 23/8 (1909): 822-34.

Kanász, Viktor. "The Life and Work of the Abbot and Nuncio Girolamo Martinengo in Hungary". *Specimina Nova Pars Prima Sectio Mediaevalis*, 10 (2019) 211-30.

Kanász, Viktor. *Magyarország és a Szentszék a 16. század közepén. Girolamo Martinengo nuncius és a Magyar Királyság (1550-1554).* PhD diss., University of Pécs, 2022.

Koller, Alexander. "La dieta di Augusta del 1582 come spazio di esperienza diplomatica. L'esempio dei rappresentanti della curia romana", in

Diplomatische Wissenkulturen der Frühen Neuzeit. Erfahrungsräume und Orte der Wissensproduktion, edited by Guido Braun, 113-134. Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2018.
Korpás, Zoltán. "I. Ferdinánd levelezése V. Károly melletti követével, Juan Alonso de Gámizzal. (1542-1556)". *Fons*, 16 (2009): 249-306, 16 (2009): 309-72.
Korpás Zoltán, and B. Szabó János. "If they came as a legation, they are many, if they are soldiers, they are few. The military background of the 1551 attempt to unite Hungary". In *Isabella Jagiellon, Queen of Hungary (1539-1559)*, edited by Ágnes Máté and Teréz Oborni, 147-62. Budapest: MTA BTK, 2020.
Kruppa, Tamás. "Pestisjárvány és háború a 16. századi Magyarországon". In *Dögvészkalauz. Járványok és gyógyításuk története az ókortól napjainkig*, edited by Czeferner Dóra and Fedeles Tamás, 95-104. Pécs: Kronosz Könyvkiadó, 2021.
Kulcsár, Péter, ed. *Humanista történetírók*. Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1977.
Kupke, Georg, ed. *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Bertano und Pietro Camaiani 1550-1552*. Berlin, 1901.
Lutz, Heinrich, ed. *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Camaiani und Achille de Grassi. Legation des Girolamo Dandino (1552-1553)*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1959.
Fraknói, Vilmos, ed. *Magyar Országgyűlési emlékek. Magyar Királyság (1526-1606), Erdély (1540-1699)*. Monumenta Hungariae Historica 3. Monumenta Comitialia regni Hungariae 3. 1546-1556. Budapest: MTA, 1876.
Pálffy, Géza. *A császárváros védelmében. A győri főkapitányság története 1526-1598*. Győr: Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Győri Levéltár, 1999.
Sörös, Pongrác. "Egy fejezet Oláh Miklós életéből". *Katolikus Szemle*, 19 (1905): 113-33.
Sugár, István. *Az egri vár és viadala*. Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1971.
Szántó, Imre. *A végvári rendszer kiépítése és fénykora Magyarországon. 1541-1593*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985.
Thuani, Jac[ques] Aug[uste]. *Historiarum sui temporis opera. 1*. [s.l.] 1609.
Tóth, Sándor László. "Két világ között: Tót Mihály és a "szegedi veszedelem" 1552-ben". In *Oszmán-magyar viszony a 16-18. században*, edited by J. Újváry Zsuzsanna, 89-110. Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2020.
Turba, Gustav, ed. *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe (Dispacci di Germania)*. I-II. Wien: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1892.
Tusor, Péter. "A konstanzi bulla alkalmazása. A magyar királyi főkegyúri jog a 15–16. században". In "*Causa unionis, causa fidei, causa reformationis in capite et membris. Tanulmányok a konstanzi Zsinat 600. évfordulója alkalmából*, edited by Attila Bárány and László Pósán, 219-39. Debrecen: Printart-Press, 2014.
Tusor Péter, and Nemes Gábor, ed. *Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae (1426-1605)*. Budapest-Roma: Gondolat Kiadó, 2011.
Varga, Szabolcs. *Europe's Leonidas: Miklós Zrínyi, Defender of Szigetvár (1508-1566)*. Budapest: RCH HAS, 2016.
Veress, D. Csaba. *A szegedi vár*. Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1986.